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ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND THE DE LA PLATA
RIVER BASIN: A SUMMARY REVIEW
OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
GUILLERMO J. CANO*

THE PHYSICAL FRAME

The De la Plata River, formed by the confluence of the Parana and
Uruguay Rivers, is the natural ingress and egress to a hugh South
American hinterland of 3,225,000 km2 covering the entire Republic
of Paraguay, and parts of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay.1
This region, the De la Plata Basin, is today inhabited by approximately 60 million people, and the largest Latin American cities,
Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo, are situated therein. According to the
Papal Bull issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493, both banks of the
De la Plata River were Spanish, but first the Portuguese and later the
Brazilians occupied the left bank and settled in the town of Colonia,
located across the river from Buenos Aires. A war in 1826, won by
Argentina on the battlefield but lost at the table of negotiations,
created the Republic of Uruguay, which occupies all the left bank of
the De la Plata River, as a buffer between Argentina and Brazil. This
prevents Brazil from sharing control over the De La Plata River and
bars Brazilian access to the door of the aforementioned hinterland.
Brazil is trying to create access with other all-Brazilian outlets such
as railroads, highways, and in particular by building an artificial
navigable waterway from the upper Uruguay River down to Porto
Alegre and the Atlantic Ocean, through Laguna de los Patos and Rio
Grande do Sul port, connecting by means of locks the Ibicui River
running westward with the Jacui River running eastward and emptying into the Atlantic Ocean through the Laguna de los Patos.2 It
would be a small scale St. Lawrence Seaway, making a bypass to the
De la Plata River.
All the rivers which Argentina and Brazil share are part of the
hydrographic system of the De la Plata Basin. They are the following: Paraguay, Parana, Iguazu, San Antonio, Uruguay, Pepiri-Guazu,
*Honorary President, International Association for Water Law (Rome).
1. See UNITAR, International navigable waterways (Doc. UNITAR/74/ST/6, 1974), at
160. (G. Cano, ed., 1974); Panamerican Union, Antecedentes sobre el desarrollo de la
Cuenca de la Plata, 73, 866 (1967).
2. 11 Conference of Foreign Ministers of De la Plata River Basin, Final Minute, national
project nr. B-4 (Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, 1968); 1. F. Rojas, Intereses argentinos en la
Cuenca de la Plata 62 (Buenos Aires, Museo Social Argentino ed., 1969).
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and De la Plata. Thirty-seven percent of the Argentine continental
area lies within the De la Plata Basin, but only thirty-two percent of
the Basin belongs to Argentina: seventeen percent of Brazilian territory is within the Basin, yet forty-four percent of its surface belongs
to Brazil.
The most important potential use of the waters and slopes of the
De la Plata system is hydroelectric generation. In the stretches where
the Parana River flows through Brazilian territory, Brazil has built
the Jupia (1,400 Mw), Ilha Solteira (3,200 Mw), and Tiete (1,200
Mw) hydroelectric dams. In 19731 Brazil and Paraguay agreed to
build a hydroelectric dam at Itaipu on the stretch of the Parana
which separates the two countries. Itaipu is but 17 km from the
Argentine border. The final design of this 10,700 Mw dam is already
under execution.
Paraguay and Argentina subscribed in the Treaty of Asuncion in
1973 to build a multi-purpose dam for hydroelectricity, navigation,
and flood control on the Parana River at Yacireta-Apipe (4,050
Mw), and constituted an Upper Parana Joint Commission to carry
out preliminary surveys for construction of another dam, Corpus,
upstream from Yacireta-Apipe and downstream from Itaipu. In the
Argentine stretch of the Parana River, studies are being made for a
multipurpose dam for hydroelectric generation, land reclamation,
and navigation between the Argentine cities of Parana and Santa Fe.
In the Uruguay River, Argentina and Uruguay are building a
hydroelectric and navigation dam at Salto Grande (1,260 Mw).
Argentina and Brazil are studying the hydroelectric development of
3. The Paraguay River rises in Brazil and its upper course serves, along 68 Km (42 miles)
only, as the boundary between Brazil and Bolivia. In this section Bolivia has the only
corridor giving direct access to a navigable waterway running to the Atlantic Ocean through
its planned Puerto Busch. The Treaty of Peace with Paraguay after the war of 1932-35
recognized this corridor to Bolivia. Puerto Busch is 140 Km. from the large Bolivian iron ore
deposit of El Mutun, but is located in marshlands and its land communication with the rest
of Bolivia needs to be improved. See (Bolivian) Servicio de HidrograviaNaval, El transporte
fluvial en Bolivia, Vol. IV (1966). The Paraguay River then marks the boundary between
Brazil and Paraguay, flows onward across Paraguayan territory and finally marks the
Paraguayan-Argentine frontier and discharges into the Parana River at the point where the
Parana enters Argentine territory; the Parana River rises in Brazil, becomes the boundary
between Paraguay and Brazil, between Argentina and Paraguay, crosses the Argentine territory from the juncture with the Paraguay River, and empties into the De la Plata River;
the Iguazu River, a tributary of the Parana, rises and flows in Brazil and later marks the
Argentine-Brazilian border; the San Antonio River, a tributary of the lguazu, serves along its
entire course as boundary between Argentina and Brazil; the Uruguay River, rising in Brazil,
soon becomes the boundary between Argentina and Brazil and further downstream between
Argentina and Uruguay. It empties into the De la Plata; the Pepiri-Guazu River, a tributary
of the Uruguay, serves along its entire course as a boundary between Argentina and Brazil;
the De la Plata River serves as access to the Parana and Uruguay Rivers, and is the boundary
between Argentina and Uruguay.
4. Treaty of Brazilia, April 26, 1973.
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the Pepiri-Guazu and Upper Uruguay River where it divides the two
countries. Brazil has made many hydroelectric developments in the
stretch of the Uruguay flowing through its territory.
Brazil, as a matter of policy, has built hydroelectric works in its
national stretches of rivers forming part of the De la Plata Basin,
without consulting Argentina or Uruguay (downstream countries)
and even withholding information owed its neighbors, as we shall see
below. Casella and Freire5 examine in detail this unilateral electric
power policy.
The second most important use of these rivers is navigation. Only
4,625 km of the 6,250 navigable km of the De la Plata Basin are
actually navigated. The Parana is navigated up to Puerto Mendes,
Brazil; the Paraguay to Corumba, Brazil; the Uruguay only to SaltoConcordia, and navigation does not reach Brazil. Argentina spends
over 5 million U.S. dollars each year maintaining the channels of
access to the Port of Buenos Aires and the Port itself, and is building
a 50 million dollar direct approach channel to the Parana River from
the Port of Buenos Aires.
River navigation in the De la Plata Basin is not as well developed as
it should be. Other means of transportation such as railroads, highways, and airways compete advantageously with the waterways. The
advent of the LASH vessels, which first arrived in the De la Plata
River late in 1973, may, if the institutional obstacles hindering their
use are surmounted, produce a boom in the region by linking river
with ocean transportation; adoption of a modular system would permit door-to-door transportation from the De la Plata hinterland to
the heart of Europe or the United States. 6 In any case, economic
development of the region should increase river traffic and the
importance of its navigational use. The Salto Grande and Yacireta
dams will sizeably improve existing navigation facilities and influence
additional navigational uses.
The waters of the De la Plata system are used widely in both
Argentina and Brazil for domestic, municipal, and industrial purposes. In Argentina they are used for irrigation of rice fields; in Brazil
there is no significant use of this type. Many cities, including Rosario
and Buenos Aires, as well as Sao Paulo, Corumba and others, discharge their sewage and industrial wastes directly into the rivers of
the De la Plata Basin system.
5. A. Casella & F. Freyre, La energ6tica y el desarrollo De la Cuenca de la Plata 17, 184,
188 (Cuenca, ed., 1973).
6. See supra note 1, at 181 (UNITAR): D. Monson, Regional Planning in the Argentine
Sector of the Plata Basin, Report of the UN Technical Assistance Program to the Argentine
Government (1964).
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De la Plata Basin river flooding seriously affects, from time to
time, Argentina and Uruguay. Some of this flooding may be caused
by dam operating methods in those countries, as well as in upstream
Brazil. 7 If appropriate agreements existed, these dams could be used
for flood control. In the upper valley of the Paraguay River, covering
parts of Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay, there is a huge depression
known as El Pantanal (The Morass) which produces the natural
hydrologic phenomenon of delaying the annual flood of the Paraguay River, preventing it from rising concurrently with the Parana,
and diminishing the effect of regular inundations of the Parana in
Argentina. 8 The problem of flooding in the downstream countries
will improve or worsen depending on Brazil's policies of dam operation.
BRAZIL FAVORS THE ADOPTION OF PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS LAW: THE AGREEMENT FOR THE URUGUAY RIVER SUB-BASIN

Beginning in 1932, Brazil consistently espoused the adoption of
the general principal of international rivers law and consultation with
coriparians. The Permanent Commission of International Public Law
of Rio de Janeiro produced a report dated July 23, 1932, and signed
by the most outstanding Brazilian internationalists, which read:9
As regards successive international rivers: When a water course
crosses consecutively the territories of two or more States: a) the
point at which the water crosses the frontier naturally or since time
immemorial may not be altered by works carried out by one of the
States without the consent of the other State in whose territory the
outlet point is situated; b) it is forbidden to produce harmful alterations to the waters and to discharge therein noxious materials from
factories, etc.; it shall be unlawful to divert through works, particularly hydroelectric plants, such an amount of water that the usable
or essential nature of the water course when entering the down7. See Monson, Id. at 21.
8. See Cordevro, 3 Nature and Resources No. 2 (UNESCO, June 1967); Lisoni &Stretta,
9 Nature and Resources No. 1 (UNESCO, March 1973); and Strangeway & Lisoni, 9 Nature
and Resources No. 4 (UNESCO, Dec. 1973).

9. Signers of the report were Clovis Bevilacqua, rapporteur; Epitacio Pessoa; Rodrigo
Octavio; Eduardo Espinola; Prudente de Moraes; and Levi Carneiro, who was later to become Judge of The Hague International Court of Justice. See in full in Boletin da Sociedade
Brazileira de Direito Internacional, V. 1, #1, at 161 (1945); I. Zanotti, Aproveitamento dos
rios e lagos internacionais para fins industrials e agricolas, also in Boletin da Sociedade
Brasileira de Dereito Internacional, V. XX, #39-40, at 6 (1964); Panamerican Union
Documents for the Use of the Delegates to the 7th American International Conference,
Montevideo, Uruguay, December 3, 1933; Report of the Permanent Commission on International Public Law established in Rio de Janeiro on item 7 of the Conference Agenda (1933).
See also Intergovernmental Committee of the De la Plata River Basin Countries (hereinafter
cited to as CIC), Minute of the 98th Meeting, speech of the Argentinian Ambassador.
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stream territory has been seriously modified. ... From the body of

those rules proposed by the Institute de Droit International and
which gained the adherence of the most eminent internationalists, a
general dominant principal arises: The industrialutilization of international water courses, whether successive or contiguous, presupposed the consent of the States directly concerned with respect to
navigation, in safeguard of public health.. . . In conclusion, for in-

dustrial or agricultural utilization of international river waters, agreement between riparian states is essential, because this usage may

have varying effects on the other bank, if the river is contiguous, or
in the territory of the neighbouring country, if the river is successive.
This fundamental principal is foreseen in the Program.
On December 23, 1933 in Montevideo, Uruguay, the 7th Interamerican Conference adopted, with the votes of Argentina, Brazil,
and the other De la Plata Basin countries, the LXXII Declaration on
Industrial and Agricultural Use of International Rivers. 1 I The
Rapporteur of the Draft Declaration was the Uruguayan Ambassador, Pineyro Chain, who pointed out as principal source of the
draft the "very remarkable report of the Rio de Janeiro Commission," partially transcribed above. The Declaration adopted the
principle of previous consultation between coriparian countries to
build hydraulic works, and provided a procedural mechanism therefor.'I

In addition to its vote on the LXXII Declaration, the Brazilian
government introduced bilaterally with Uruguay the concept of prior
agreement for construction of hydraulic works in the De la Plata
Basin, and signed an agreement requiring that neither contracting
State shall build hydraulic works which might alter the natural
course of either contiguous or successive rivers without the consent
of the other State.' 2
On March 27, 1963, the Brazilian government took the initiative
of requesting the Secretary General of the Organization of American
States (OAS) 1 3 to convene a Special Conference for the purpose of
"examining agricultural and industrial exploitation of international
rivers and lakes and to subscribe the international instrument(s) containing general rules on the matter." In the application, the Brazilian
10. OAS, Rios internacionales-Utilizacion para fines industrialies y agricolas, doc. Ser.
l/Vl, CIJ-75, at 97 (1964).
11. In spite of the prestige of said seven Brazilian jurists responsible for the content of
the Montevideo Declaration, 37 years later the Brazilian Ambassador to the CIC said that
the Montevideo Declaration had "fundamental mistakes." CIC, Minute of Meeting n. 97

(1970).
12. See infra note 16, Annex 4 at xi.
13. OAS doc. Sec. G/VI, c/INF-231.
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government asserted that "if the Interamerican system had modern
and adequate legislation adopted pursuant to the requirements of
modern technique, it would be ready (upon agreeing to a River Convention) to carry out the noble purpose of avoiding conflicts of
interest ..... " And with respect to the Convention it proposes to
adopt, it points out among its main purposes:
those of fixing the rights and responsibilities of coriparian States,
specifying juridically certain concepts and rules concerning said
problem, delimiting powers and, in that way, setting the bases for a
convention to rule definitely on the matter.
On October 16, 1964, the Brazilian government reiterated its proposal.
The II Extraordinary Interamerican Conference, held in Rio de
Janeiro in November, 1965, adopted the Xth Resolution which convoked the Special Conference pursuant to the terms proposed by
Brazil and delegated to the OAS Council the fixing of its date and
agenda. In January, 1969, Mr. Neves da Rocha, Brazilian delegate to
UNITAR's Latin American Seminar of International Law at Quito,
still supported the idea of adopting an Interamerican River Convention and calling for a Special Conference to negotiate it. ,4
Argentina and Uruguay, by virtue of the Treaty of Salto
Grande,' ' were planning a dam at Salto Grande at the site where the
river forms their boundary and downstream from the ArgentineBrazilian frontier. By virtue of article 11 of that Treaty, and also of
the Brazilian-Uruguayan Agreement mentioned above, Brazil was
consulted by both countries, although it was not a party to the
Treaty of Salto Grande. On September 23, 1960, the three governments issued a Tripartite Joint Declaration.' 6 In that Declaration the
Brazilian Government undertook "in case of execution of hydraulic
works which could entail the alteration of the present Uruguay River
regime" to "previously consult the other riparians, pursuant to international doctrine and practices." ' ' Also, the three governments
14. But this conference has not been held, because Brazil now finds it inconvenient for
its interests to adopt, by means of a multilateral Convention, general principles of international river law. On legal antecedents concerning navigation in the De laPlata River Basin,
see OAS, Textos de documentos sobre el uso comercial de rios y lagos internacionales (doc.
OAS, Ser. 1 VI.1-CIJ 97), at 12 (1968). See also UNITAR, Latin American Seminar on
International Law, Report on the Legal and Institutional Problems of the Multinational
Projects for Water Resources Development in Latin America, doc. 8, para. 31 (Quito, 1969).
15. See infra note 16, Annex 2 at iii.
16. Cano, The Uruguay River: a Case of International Understanding, mimeo ed. of
I.L.A. Comm. on International Rivers 22 (The Hague, 1961); see also OAS supra note 10, at
377.
17. Id. clause 4.
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declared their "intention to elaborate a joint plan for the regional
area with a view to the utilization and reclamation of the entire basin
of the Uruguay River and adjacent regions." The principle of prior
consultation, which Brazil now refuses to accept for the remainder of
the Basin, is contractually in force in one of the three sub-basins of
the De la Plata Basin and in that same area Brazil has accepted the
necessity of joint and integral planning of the entire sub-basin, which
it also refuses for the remainder of the Basin.' 8
ITAMARATY TURNS AGAINST THE ADOPTION OF
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Shortly after the institutional mechanism of the De la Plata Basin
began operating, Itamaraty, the Brazilian Foreign Office, drastically
changed its attitude. The term Itamaraty is used rather than Brazil
because, aside from Valladao and Fernandes, other distinguished
Brazilian voices did not share Itamaraty's attitude. The President of
the Federal Supreme Court, Aliomar de Andrade Balleeiro, in a
speech on March 15, 1972, and the former Minister of Economy,
Roberto Campos, in a press statement on March 9, 1972, among
others, stated their disagreement publicly on the occasion of a visit
from the Argentine President.' 9
In 1970, at the meeting of the Intergovernmental Coordinating
Committee of the De la Plata Basin (CIC), 2 ° the representative for
the Argentine Republic invoked the
principle of international rivers law emerging from those of selflimited sovereignty, international coexistence and good neighbourhood that today, fortunately almost without exception, govern
international relations. Those principles of river law first appeared in
the American sphere in the Declaration of the 7th Interamerican
18. In its Agreement by Exchange of Notes with the United Kingdom, with reference to
the rivers it shares with British Guyana, on November 1, 1932, Brazil also adopted the
principles of prior consultation and consent, for the construction of works in international
rivers. OAS, supra note 10, at 51, 340; Rojas, supra note 3, at viii.
The Interamerican Juridical Committee and the Interamerican Council of Jurisconsults,
both of the OAS, have been elaborating a draft for an Interamerican River Convention, to
be discussed in the Special Conference (text at note 13, supra). The various drafts prepared
included the principles of consultation, exchange of information, and consent for works
which may cause damage. They are signed by Raul Fernandes and Haroldo Valladao, the
most prominent contemporary Brazilian internationalists. The last one is dated September
1, 1965. OAS Official Records, interamerican Juridical Committee, Industrial and Agricultural Use of International Rivers and Lakes, Revised Report and Draft Convention (doc.
Ser. I/VI.2; CIJ-79; (1965); Zonotti, supra note 9, at 13.
19. T Dominguez, Un discurso fuera de programa, La Naci6n (Buenos Aires), March 16,
1972. Osnyr Duarte Pereyra, itaipu pros e contras (Paz e Terra, eds., Rio de Janeiro, 1974).
20. CIC, Minute of Meeting nr. 96 (1970).
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Conference in Montevideo in 1933 and, extended and updated, may
be read, since 1966, in the Helsinki Rules. 2 On the other hand,
they are those practiced by my Government in its relationships both
with its coriparians in the De la Plata Basin and with the neighbouring Republic of Chile ... in my Government's opinion, both the
threaty of the De la Plata Basin and this Committee are the resultsamong other factors-of the convenience and need to secure the
effectiveness of the former.
Such invocation of the adoption of principles of international river
law as one of the objectives of the Treaty of Brazilia produced an
immediate and unequivocal answer from the Brazilian Ambassador.2 2 After defining the Helsinki Rules as a "speculative and
academic exercise," he questioned the reference to these
principles within a specific structure (the Treaty of the De la Plata
Basin), on which there is no official statement by the countries of
the De la Plata Basin and which involve, in the Brazilian Government's understanding, a thesis we thought was unacceptable to all,
whereas it violates the exercise of the States' sovereignty.
Suddenly the Harmon Doctrine appeared revived. The Brazilian representative denied that the Treaty or the CIC had the purpose or
even the intention of consecrating a set of juridical rules for the total
regulation of any subjects which may be connected with the Basin
development process. He added that the governments which had
signed the Treaty adopted therein an inductive method wherewith
the initial acceptance of a structure of doctrinary principles does not
agree, and recalled that the Uruguayan representatives had proposed
at the CIC on December 26, 1968, a draft:
Statute of the Use and Administration of the Water Resource, which
the CIC could never get to consider because, among other things, the
Brazilian representation held with the heads of the other representations bilateral conversations ...insisting on the Brazilian Government determination of not accepting the idea of a juridical Statute
aiming at an a priori legal regulation of the use, and even less the
administration, of the water resources of the Basin, including those
of the water courses flowing across its territory, whereas such document would attempt against the exercise of its sovereignty.
... Brazil would not accept, under any circumstances, any document which directly or indirectly consecrated the thesis of compulsory prior consultation, applied to successive rivers, whereas it
considered it specifically attempting against its sovereignty.
21. See International Law Association, Report of the 52nd Conference-Helsinki 1966,
477; see also OAS doc.Ser. I/VI; CIJ-75 rev. at 597 (1967).
22. CIC, Minute of Meeting no. 97 (1970).
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From the Brazilian veto arose the tacit decision to freeze the
preliminary draft Statute in the CIC.2 3
This position has been reiterated in opposing the Finnish initiative
that the UN General Assembly, while entrusting the International
Commission of Jurists to codify international river law, 2 4 recommend the interim acknowledgement of the Helsinki Rules as principles of international river law, and when it opposed the UN
convocation of a World Water Conference in Buenos Aires in 1977
because its agenda contained subjects on river law.2 I UNITAR, in
December 1970, held in Buenos Aires a Symposium on the Financial,
Juridical, and Institutional Aspects of Navigation of International
Navigable Rivers and Channels. There, an observer from the Brazilian
Government objected2 6 to the application of the Helsinki Rules in
the sphere of the De la Plata Basin, and asserted it was not possible
to "allow ourselves to be pigeonholed within the easy but inapplicable principles which inspired the Declaration of Montevideo of
1933 and the documents and doctrines based thereon." The Brazilian
position with respect to Principle 20 of the Declaration of Stockholm is based on the same grounds.
The reversal of Itamaraty's position probably is the result of the
fact that the Brazilian Government is speedily carrying out the
development of its hydroelectric resources in the Brazilian stretches
of the De la Plata Basin rivers and also, in agreement with Paraguay,
in the Itaipu Project stretch of the Parana River which forms their
boundary. Brazil has not consulted its coriparians on these projects,
perhaps because it fears that consultations may delay its development process due to Argentine claims2 7 founded on the risk of
23. During the 1st International Conference on Water Law (Buenos Aires-Mendoza
1968), Mr. E. Ferrer Vieyra, representing the OAS Legal Division, proposed to adopt for the
De la Plata River Basin the Draft Convention referred to at note 17, supra. See International
Association for Water Law, I Annales Juris Aquarum xiv and 382 (1968), including the
Draft Statute suggested by Mr. Vieyra.
24. Cano, La politica fluvial internacional y las elecciones, Clarin (Buenos Aires), January

11, 1973.
25. See, among others, UN docs. E/C.7/SR.4 (26 Feb. 1971), at 13; E/C.7/SR.8, at 24;

E]C.7/SR.23, at 13.
26: Doc. UNITAR/SYMP.1/BP 15 (December 2, 1970), speech of the Brazilian observer,
Rodrigues Valle.
27. A note filed March 29, 1973, on the CIC by the Argentine Delegation claimed that
the filling of the Isla Solteira Dam, to be started by Brazil on April 1, 1973, was not
officially reported to the coriparian governments, as is the Brazilian duty according to the
Agreement by exchange of notes reached in New York on September 29, 1972, pursuant to
UNGA Resolution 2995 (XXVII). Rev. Recursos Hidricos, vol. 3, #10, p. 98, Buenos Aires,
1973. Moreover, on March 20, 1973, the Argentine Foreign Ministry released a press statement claiming that on Oct. 29, 1968; Jan. 21, 1969; April 29, 1969; and Oct. 29, 1969 the
Argentine government requested in writing to the Brazilian government the adoption of

principles of law and the right to be previously informed and consulted on the occasion of
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decrease of the navigability levels of the Basin rivers in the stretches
crossing its territory. Brazil has agreed, only after finishing the Jupia
and Ilha Solteira dams, to negotiate the operative schemes of their
filling.
THE CONCEPT OF SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES COMES
INTO THE PICTURE: STOCKHOLM AND AFTER
Reciprocal interdependence between water and other natural
resources and all their uses and effects is a generally admitted fact 2 8
which justifies their integrated treatment. 2 9 This interdependence
was specifically addressed by the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment at Stockholm in June, 1972, which adopted by
consensus the Declaration of Stockholm.3" Both Argentina. and
Brazil voted for its principles 21 and 22:
Principle 21. States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign

right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdictions or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22. States shall cooperate to further develop the international law regarding liability and compensation in respect of pollution and other environmental damage which is caused by activities
within their jurisdiction or control to the environment of areas
beyond their jurisdiction.
But the discussion of Principle 20, which referred to the obligation
of supplying information on the use of natural resources, including
international rivers, caused a debate led by Argentina and Brazil
which impeded the consensus under which the Declaration was
adopted. That led the Conference to refer the subject to the next UN
hydraulic works to be built on the rivers of the De la Plata system. The filling of the Jupia
Dam gave rise to these protests. See La Naci6n (Buenos Aires), March 21, 1973.
28. Cano, Problemas juridicos e institucionales de los proyectos multinacionales de
desarrollo hidrico en Amdrica Latina y el Caribe, in Corporaciones pfiblicas multinacionales
para el desarrollo y la integraci6n de Amdrica Latina, 281 & 300, Kaplan ed. (1972);
International Law Association, Report of the 53rd Conference, Buenos Aires 1968, 531;
UNITAR, Seminar, note 14, supra, Legal and InstitutionalProblems of MultinationalProjects for Water Resources Development in Latin America, at 4; see also Cano, Problemdtica
juridico politica de los recursos naturalesinternacionales,151 rev. La Ley 982 (1973).
29. See Cano, !ntroducci6n al derecho ambientalargentino, 154 La Ley (1974); see also
Magarinos de Mello, Apuntes para una teoria del derecho ambiental, Primeras Jornadas
Argentinas de Derecho y Administraci6n Ambientales-Documentos de Trabajo 33 (1974).
30. UN doc. A/Conf.48/14, at 2 (July 1972).
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General Assembly. 3 ' Shortly before that Assembly, the ministers of
foreign affairs of Argentina and Brazil concluded a bilateral agreement containing the following principles:
1) in exploration, exploitation and development of their natural
resources, States must not provoke sensible harmful effects on zones
located outside their national jurisdictions; 2) cooperation between
States in the field of environment, including cooperation for fulfillment of principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration on Human Environment will be achieved adequately by furnishing mutual official and
public knowledge of the technical data regarding the works to be
undertaken by the States within their national jurisdictions with the
purpose of preventing sensible harm which may be caused in the
human environment of the neighbouring area; 3) the technical data
mentioned in the foregoing shall be given and received with the best
spirit of cooperation and good neighbourhood, without that being
interpreted as allowing any State to delay or hinder the programs
and projects for exploration, exploitation and development of the
natural resources of the States in whose territories such programs
and projects may be undertaken. (Item 3 was introduced upon
Brazilian proposal.)
The same text also was introduced as a draft resolution at the
General Assembly by Argentina, Brazil, and fifty-eight other countries, and it was adopted as Resolution 2995 (XXVII). The text
established the obligation of furnishing prior information, but not
consultation, and it does not require prior agreement for construction of works in international rivers.
Recommendation 51 of the Stockholm ConferConcomitantly,
32
ence reads:

When carrying out important activities in connection with water
resources which may have considerable environmental effects in
other countries, this fact must be notified to the other country well
in advance before commencing the foreseen activities.
The detente which began with the New York Agreement lasted
only six months. The following April Ist, Brazil started filling the
Ilha Solteira dam on the Parana River. Shortly before that, Argentina
claimed it had not been informed pursuant to the terms of Resolution 2995 (XXVII). Brazil replied in a letter dated April 1, 1973,
that the applicable rule was not that Resolution which, however, it
protested to have fulfilled, but the "practice of Jupia" which Brazil
contended had been accepted by CIC resolution of March 22, 1972
31. Id. at 119.

32. Id. at 33.
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and approved by Resolution 26(v) of the Conference of the De la
Plata Basin Foreign Ministers. The "practice of Jupia" requires each
country to publish in its own newspapers, without formal notification to the other countries, certain hydrologic data. Brazil additionally argued that only it may judge whether the works it planned
to build would cause sensible harm to other riparian countries and
thereby create an obligation to notify them.
Argentina denounced the New York Agreement on June 10, 1973.
The UN General Assembly returned to the subject upon the initiative
of Argentina and fifty-two other countries and adopted, in December, 1973, Resolution 3129 (XXVIII):
1) It is necessary to secure efficient cooperation among the countries by establishing international rules concerning conservation and
harmonic exploitation of natural resources common to two or more
States; 2) cooperation among countries sharing such natural resources and interested in their exploitation should be developed on
the basis of a previous information and consultation system, within
the frame of the existing normal relationships among them.
This was a Pyrrhic victory for Argentina. Among the four coriparians
in the De ]a Plata Basin, Uruguay abstained from voting, and Brazil,
Bolivia, and Paraguay voted against the resolution.
THE TREATY OF THE DE LA PLATA BASIN

The Treaty of Brazilia originated on Argentine initiative. On
February 24-27, 1967, upon invitation from the Argentine Government, the first Conference of Foreign Ministers of the five De la Plata
Basin countries was held in Buenos Aires. This Conference produced
a general declaration of intentions referring to a joint development
program and it organized the Intergovernmental Coordinating
Committee of the De la Plata Basin Countries (CIC), composed of
the ambassadors of the five nations. 3 The lind Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, on May
18-20, 1968, and approved the CIC Statute as well as the undertaking of preliminary studies on a list of projects to be completed, some
multilaterally and others unilaterally. The draft Treaty was negotiated inside the CIC and signed at Brazilia on April 23, 1969, at the
3
IlIrd Conference of Foreign Ministers. 4
The Joint Declaration of Buenos Aires (1967) defined clearly the
purposes for which the five governments undertook joint action:
33. Series de la S.S.R.H., Politica Hidrica, 5, 35-39 (November 1973).
34. Supra note 32, at 5, 43.
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to combine efforts for the harmonic and balanced development of
the region; to carry out the joint and integral study of the Basin,
aiming at the performance of a multilateral, bilateral, and national
works program; to assert the objective of integral Basin development
to which end hydroelectric studies tending to the power integration
of the Basin shall be carried out; to create the CIC to centralize the
information and direct it to the interested governments and coordinate joint action; and to create by each government national
agencies for the Basin which, through CIC, shall exchange information relating to the above mentioned joint and integral study.

These purposes are expressly incorporated in the first "Whereas"
Clause of the Treaty of Brazilia.
The Act of Santa Cruz de la Sierra ratified the decision of the Act
of Buenos Aires, approving the undertaking of studies prior to the
execution of thirteen projects classified under two categories, those
shared by the five member countries, and specific national projects,
and adopting certain priority standards for their execution. Among
the shared projects were a hydrometeorologic study and an inventory and analysis of basic information on natural resources of the
Basin. Some priority standards adopted were: a) those which secure
the maximum exploitation of the water resource; b) infrastructural
projects aiming at the coordination and integration of such infrastructure; c) those which prevent alterations which may affect in a
duly verified way the maximum exploitation of rivers. Furthermore,
it entrusted the CIC with preparation of a Statute to rule the use and
administration of the water resources. 3
The Basin Program is not a complete economic integration of the
area, but rather a physical integration of the regional substructure, a
multilateral coordination and cooperation agreement for the performance of studies and works for integral development of a multinational region characterized by a hydrographic basin. In essence this
implies adoption of the principle of geoeconomic unity of the Basin,
and the need for an all encompassing study with the purpose of
maximizing the integral exploitation of its resources. 3 6 In the Treaty
of Brazilia, the signatories agreed to combine efforts for the purpose
of promoting the harmonic development and physical integration of
the Basin, undertaking studies, programs and works leading to the
rational utilization of the water resource, and particularly to regulating the water courses and their multiple and equitable exploitation.
The mode of action thus defined and accepted in the transcribed
35. Supra note 32, at 47.
36. INTAL Hacia el desarrollo integral de la Cuenca de la Plata, 25 Boletin de la Integraci6n 19, 27, 51 (Dec. 1967).
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legal documents-global, prior, integral, joint study of a region, conceived as a geoeconomic unit, serving as basis for subsequent concrete works project-is that which the Brazilian Ambassador defined
as the "deductive method" at CIC in 1970. It is the one Brazil first
accepted and later rejected, arguing the signatory nations had
adopted the opposite one, the "inductive method." 3 This consists
of going from the particular to the general, and excludes both the
formulation of juridical rules and a general physical and economic
plan for the entire Basin; positing that for each work, technical decisions must be taken and the appropriate juridical arrangements must
be made.
I would convey the antithesis to the example of how to assemble a
puzzle. The deductive method requires, as a first step, having the
complete picture of the assembled puzzle. By referring to the pic-

ture, it is quite simple to assemble the puzzle. The inductive method
calls for assembling the puzzle without knowing what the finished
picture will be. The former has an initially established objective. The
latter pursues an unknown objective. It seems to me that the second
method is much more costly, and involves many more mistakes and
much more time 3 8
Brazil accepted the deductive method for the Uruguay River SubBasin, but refused to do so for the remainder of the De la Plata
Basin. The idea which originally inspired the five riparian governments to start an institutional mechanism to jointly develop the
Basin has been countermanded. There are no joint activities. Everything is handled bilaterally. Brazil and Paraguay have agreed to build
the Itaipu dam which could, due to lack of coordination and exchange of information, interfere with the Argentine-Paraguayan
Corpus dam located downstream on the same river.
When invitations were being sent for the 1st Conference of
Foreign Ministers of the Basin, in April 1966, the Governments of
Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay requested the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) to promote, coordinate, and supply technical
and financial support to assist the necessary multinational action in
the Basin. The IDB delegated this task to one of its branches, Institute for Latin American Integration (INTAL). IDB and INTAL, in
conjunction with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), the Interamerican Committee for the Alliance for Progress
37. See Cano, Reflexiones sobre nuestra politicafluvial internacional,La Naci6n (Buenos
Aires), May 25, 1971; CIC, Minute of the no. 97 Meeting (April 2, 1970), speech of the
Brazilian Ambassador.
38. G. S.Cano, Argentine Ambassador to the CIC, in CIC, Minute of the no. 98 Meeting
(April 17, 1970).
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(CLAP), and the UN Development Program (UNDP), succeeded in
organizing, in November, 1967, an International Assistance Coordinating Board, with INTAL acting as Secretary.3 9 INTAL created
and funded its own De la Plata Basin Program and began its efficient
operation but, as it acted pursuant to the "deductive method," soon
the program, INTAL, and IDB were out of the picture and the
Coordinating Board died of starvation. Oddly, the Joint Declaration
of Buenos Aires, in 1967, whose paragraph V proclaimed the need
for assistance from international bodies, records that the IDB-INTAL
intervention was requested only by Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay.
A KAFKIAN MODEL: THE ORGANIZATIONAL40 MACHINERY
OF THE TREATY OF BRAZILIA
Six levels of bodies exist under the Treaty of Brazilia. The Treaty
itself created three:
a. The Conference of Foreign Ministers, which is the highest, purely
political body, meeting regularly once a year; it acts only by unanimous vote and directs the action of the CIC (Clause 1I);
b. The CIC (Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee), formed
by the Ambassadors accredited before the government of the host
country (Argentina) or in default thereof, by officials whose rank is
not less than Plenipotentiary Minister, is a permanent body that
holds weekly meetings and is "in charge of promoting, coordinating,
and following-up the progress of multinational actions... and of the
technical and financial assistance it may organize ... and of imple-

menting the decisions of the Conference
of Ministers (Clause III of
4
the Treaty and ad hoc Statute) 1
c. The National Commissions or Secretariats of each government,
organized to execute the action of each government concerning the
Basin, are "bodies of cooperation and advice to the Governments"
but not to the CIC (Clause V of the Treaty). The CIC has never had
any direct regular contacts with these national agencies.
The CIC Statute created:
d. The CIC Secretariat (Statute, Chapter VI), and its article 10 has
given rise to the creation of a fifth level;
e. Ad hoc Commissions and Groups of Experts. The Act of Braziia
(April 24, 1969) of the Illrd Conference of Foreign Ministers (item
39. Supra note 35.

40. INTAL El sistema institucional de laCuenca del Plata, Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteuiores y Culto, ed. (1973).
41. Supra note 32, at 11.
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1, A, a, and IV, a) also refers to them. 4 2 Some Groups of Experts,
on their own, have created the last level;
f. Working or Specialists Sub-Groups, responsible before the Groups
of Experts which created them.
Certain images can be borrowed from the game of basketball to
explain how this system disfunctions: the one who should introduce
the ball into the court toward the basket, that is, the Conference of
Ministers first passes back to CIC; CIC, in turn, passes back to the
Group of Experts; and the Group of Experts passes back to the
Sub-Group of Specialists. The latter decides what is to be done and
the series of passes starts anew, this time forwards, until reaching the
goal. This process is conducted at the speed of Tai-chi-chuan (Chinese gymnastics) and takes two or three years for each subject, with
a minimum of seven meetings at different levels, generally held in
different countries, and wherefrom the largest profits are obtained
by travel agencies. Evidently Kafka's spirit was present when this
system was contrived.
In summary, the inefficiency is caused by: a) the initial mistake of
including in the Treaty and allocating to CIC a range of subjects
unrelated to water resources development, such as education, flora
and fauna, railroads, and communications. These create even more
areas for friction, both international and within each government; b)
the choice of diplomats rather than technical experts to comprise the
CIC. The example of the Mekong Committee shows clearly that technical experts move more rapidly and efficiently than do diplomats,
even though they may have to request political instruction. Diplomats are aware of the latter, but lack the professional training to
understand fully the technical aspects; c) the CIC Secretariat being a
purely bureaucratic, non-technical one. Article 6, paragraph 3 of the
Statute authorizes the Secretariat to appoint technical personnel,
with CIC's authorization, which the CIC has never given. Thus, there
is no one trained to direct or handle the technical and economic
problems.4 3 The Financial Fund about to be created for the Basin' 4
might fill this gap, provided it does not become a seventh level in the
organizational chart and institutional mechanism of the Basin; d) the
plurality of levels under the Treaty, the excessive red tape involved
therein and the parsimony with which CIC acts; e) the fact that the
Groups of Experts and Ad Hoc Commissions and the Sub-Groups of
42. Supra note 32, at 62.
43. Vieyra, El derecho en un programa de desarrollo multinacional: la Cuenca de la Plata,
lecture at Louvaine Univ., Belgium, Feb. 26, 1968, mimeo ed., at 11.
44. VI Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the De la Plata River Basin, doc.CP.VI, doc.2
(June, 1974).
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Specialists or Working Sub-Groups are comprised of government
officials, experts indeed, but who work only parttime for the Groups
and Sub-Group, their main duties consisting of their customary tasks
for their respective governments; f) the fact that the budget granted
to CIC by the governments does not allow the installation of a technical secretariat or the use of consultants; g) the unanimity system
adopted, even for procedural bureaucratic questions, which creates
an implicit veto right which is frequently exercised by alleging that
no instructions were received from the respective governments, thereby postponing solutions; h) the UNDP interpretation that applications for assistance from CIC required ratification from the
respective governments, although their CIC delegates are plenipotentiary; i) the failure to use CIC as an information clearing house
among governments, as stipulated in the Treaty. Governments are
unwilling to furnish information and CIC maintains no contacts with
the national Commission or Secretariats for the Basin; j) the various
water projects which are designed and executed separately and individually, without looking upon the Basin as an entity. Itaipu and
Corpus may and must be coordinated with Yacireta Apipe, regardless
of national boundaries. The beneficiary downstream countries could
consent to finance works located upstream, even though outside
their national borders, proportionate to identifiable benefits they
might receive, if it were possible to agree upon the modus operandi
of those works and the storage capacities reserved or built for
them. 4
The June, 1974 Conference of Basin Foreign Ministers in Buenos
Aires seemed to have understood this situation. It instructed the CIC
to study ways to reorganize the institutional machinery established
by the Treaty of Brazilia to improve its efficiency, making specific
reference to the Group of Experts.4 6
FUTURE OUTLOOK
Presently it is debated whether Itaipu Dam, a Brazilian-Paraguayan
project on the Parana River, might impair Argentine rights in the
building of. the Corpus Dam which Argentina and Paraguay plan to
construct jointly, downstream on the same river. Owing to this debate, a novel subject of international law has arisen, that of vertical
45. CIC, Minute of the no. 98 Meeting (April 17, 1970), para. 5 of the speech of the
Argentine Ambassador; see also, Cano, El control internacional de las inundaciones, La
Prensa (Buenos Aires, May 30, 1959.
46. See VI Conference of the De la Plata Basin Foreign Ministers, Buenos Aires, June
1974, resolutions 46 (VI), 47 (VI), 48 (VI), and 49 (VI).
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sovereignty. Figure 1 explains this. Horizontally, the line of political
boundaries makes H-A to be Argentine territory, and A-i Brazilian
territory, this line referring to the river bed. Vertically it is the AB
line which marks the boundary. C marks the water surface boundary
when waters are low; E at average water level; and B at the level of
highest regular floods. If point E were adopted as boundary on the
water surface, it is obvious that Brazilian territory up to point F
would be inundated, by a natural occurrence not provoked by any of
the riparian countries. Here the problem lies in determining whether
Brazil is entitled, with its planned dam at Itaipu, to build the outlet
of its turbines at point J, K, or L, because the solution of this
problem will determine whether Argentina will be able to build
Corpus with a maximum reservoir capacity in M, N, or 0, which will
directly determine its hydroelectric generation potential.
TABLE 1.
Electricity Generable by the Combination of Itaipu (Brazil) and
Corpus (Argentine) Dams
(taipu
turbine
outlet

Corpus
spillway
level

Millions Kwh of yearly production

level
m.o.s.l.
I

m.o.s.l.
If

Corpus
III

Iaipu
IV

Corpus + Itaipu
V

101
118
122
127

115
120
125

0
28.600
33.000
37.500

66.900
63.900
61.200
58.300

66.900
92.500
94.200
95.800

-: non feasible
m.o.s.l.: meters over the sea level
Source: M. Fuschini Mejia, in Instituto Argentino de Politica Exterior, Conclusiones del
Seminario sobre alternativas para el aprovechamiento de las aguas del Parana y
Uruguay (Buenos Aires, 1974) p. 11.

Table I shows the amounts of electric power that could be produced annually by Itaipu (Col. IV) according to the different outlet
levels of its turbines (Col. 1); what would be the maximum reservoir
level of Corpus correlatively to each of the above outlet levels (Col.
II) and the power it may generate yearly (Col. III). Obviously, the
higher the Itaipu outlet level is, the less power it will produce, proportionately increasing the power to be produced by Corpus. But the
most important Column is V, which shows how much power could
be produced by both plants combined. It is this column that interested governments should consider to find a coordinated and
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mutually agreed upon solution. It is doubtful that the solution would
be to establish a ground level up to which Brazil would allow Argentina to inundate Brazilian territory without compensation. Instead, it
would be feasible to design a Table based on various simultaneous
combined parameters (slopes and volumes used in each country,
financial costs, etc.) which will permit both countries to adopt the
technically optimal solution for both dams combined, from the
engineering as well as from the economic point of view. This Table
should lead to agreement on the amount of power to be exported
from the generators of one power plant to the transmission lines of
the other, when the Table shows compensations, which would be
payable in power, not in money, must be made.
Similar solutions should be adopted between Bolivia (Bermejo and
Pilcomayo Rivers) and Argentina, and between Brazil and Argentina
(Iguazu, Pepiri-Guazu, and Uruguay Rivers).
The El Pantanal problem is another requiring harmonic and
coordinated solution between the countries affected, i.e., Brazil on
the one hand, and Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay, burdened by
heavy floods, on the other.
Finally, another project would be to establish a modular transportation system combining both river and ocean routes, to be
envisaged jointly and coordinately by the five Basin countries. This
would be linked closely with reaching an agreement on the financing
of the works and construction required to maintain and increase
navigability in the Basin rivers.

